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Abstract 
A cornerstone of the law and economics approach to standard form contracts is the “informed 
minority” hypothesis: in competitive markets, a minority of term-conscious buyers is enough to 
discipline sellers from offering unfavorable boilerplate terms. The informed minority argument is 
widely invoked to limit intervention in consumer transactions, but there has been little empirical 
investigation of its validity. We track the Internet browsing behavior of 45,091 households with 
respect to 66 online software companies to study the extent to which potential buyers access the 
standard form contract associated with software purchases, the end user license agreement. We 
find that only one or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to access the 
license agreement, and those that do spend too little time, on average, to have read more than a 
small portion of the license text. The results cast doubt on the relevance of the informed minority 
mechanism in a specific market where it has been invoked by both theorists and courts and, to 
the extent that comparison shopping online is relatively cheap and easy, suggest limits to the 
mechanism more generally.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Standard form contracts, or what laypersons call “fine print” or “boilerplate,” apply to 
most commercial transactions; thus they are probably the commonest type of economic contract. 
Legal academics, courts, and policymakers have long debated the degree to which standard form 
contracts should be enforced, and whether their content or disclosure should be regulated, . All 
sides in this debate realize that in most circumstances, most buyers do not read standard form 
contracts, which are too long, hard to understand, or seemingly unimportant to take the time to 
read and give meaningful assent. The central economic question is whether the fact that a 
majority of buyers enter standard form contracts under this imperfect information results in a 
market failure: if buyers do not factor contract terms into their purchase decisions, sellers lack 
incentives to provide anything more than the minimally enforceable legal protections.2 
Defenders of freedom of contracting have generally rejected intervention by relying on 
reputational constraints and on the “informed minority” argument. In this paper we focus 
exclusively on this latter argument, which has perhaps been best articulated in this context by 
Schwartz and Wilde (1979). Their articulation is a specific law and economics application of 
work on imperfect information by Spence (1977) in the context of product liability and by Salop 
and Stiglitz (1977) in the context of price dispersion and search.3 Schwartz and Wilde argue that 
sellers won’t necessarily offer one-sided terms even when the majority of buyers don’t read 
standard form contracts. In their model, non-reading buyers benefit from an informed minority 
whose willingness to pay for the product is sufficiently sensitive to the quality of the standard 
terms. When all buyers have the same taste for quality and sellers are unable to discriminate 
between reading and non-reading buyers, sellers will offer the terms preferred by all buyers. This 
                                                
2 For a comprehensive review of the factors that might contribute to consumer information problems and subsequent 
market failures, see The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, & 
Steven C. Salop, J. Law & Econ. 21(3) 491-539 (1981). See also Steven C. Salop, Information and Monopolistic 
Competition, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (1976). 
3 Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and 
Producer Liability, Review of Economic Studies (1977); Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A 
Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 493, 494 (1977).  
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argument has been used extensively to resist regulation.4 For example, it has been argued that 
imposing a uniform standard would prevent sellers from using contracts to signal their quality or 
cater to heterogeneous buyer tastes. These scholars advocate rules only to facilitate search by 
those consumers aspiring to join the informed minority. 
Although the informed minority argument is pervasive throughout the standard form 
contract literature, there has been practically no systematic empirical analysis of its validity. This 
paper addresses this void by providing the first large-sample evidence on the extent to which 
buyers actually do read standard form contracts. In other words, while we know that standard 
form contract readers are in the minority, what we don’t know is whether this minority remains 
large enough to plausibly enforce efficient terms, as continues to be assumed by some theorists 
and courts, or rather whether it is so miniscule as to be almost surely irrelevant. In this paper we 
measure the probability of reading these contracts in one specific context, we assess its economic 
significance, and weidentify some of the factors that increase or decrease this probability.  
Specifically, we study the extent to which online “shoppers” (i.e., potential buyers) for 
software products read End User License Agreements (EULAs), which are contracts that govern 
the use of these products. We use “clickstream” data to track the detailed browsing behavior of 
Internet users from a panel of 45,091 households over a period of one month. For each user in 
the panel, we observe the exact sequence of web pages (URLs) accessed and the time spent on 
each page. We use this information to study readership of the EULAs for a sample of 66 
software companies who offer their products for sale online. In addition to the clickstream 
information, the data also include detailed demographic characteristics of the users, such as age, 
gender, income, and geographic location. Our main finding is that regardless of how strictly we 
define a “shopper,” only about 0.1 or 0.2 percent access a product’s EULA for at least one 
second. For comparison, 0.2% of potential buyers is orders of magnitude smaller than the 
required size of the informed minority in the theoretical examples in the literature.  
Giving the informed minority hypothesis the maximal benefit of the doubt, we consider 
whether such a modest fraction of “informed shoppers” could be sufficiently large to induce 
sellers to offer “good” terms in the software market. We estimate the marginal cost of providing 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 933, 933 (2006); Clayton Gillette, Pre-
Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 975 (2005). See also Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra 
note 2. 
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one pro-buyer term, maintenance and support, and find that sellers would find it more cost-
effective to lose all informed buyers (that is, conservatively assuming each would decline to buy 
if the given term isn’t offered) than to offer this one term. This conclusion would likely persist 
for a fraction of informed buyers 1-2 orders of magnitude higher than 0.2%. Consequently, our 
findings cast doubt on the existence of an informed minority of a size sufficient to police against 
one-sided terms, at least in the context of software sold online. Furthermore, since online 
comparison shopping is cheap and easy, the results suggest limits to the mechanism more 
generally. 
We then focus on the factors affecting the probability that a EULA will be accessed. We 
find that shoppers are more likely to access the EULAs of smaller companies or companies that 
offer ex ante somewhat suspicious products such as freeware. The few shoppers that choose to 
become informed might be rationally deciding to ignore the EULAs of larger, more established 
companies, relying instead on company reputation or familiarity. We also find that older and 
higher income shoppers are more likely to access EULAs; this may be because these consumers 
have lower search and reading costs, e.g., because they have a lower opportunity cost for their 
time or because they are more educated and thus find it easier to read contract terms. While only 
a tiny fraction of consumers read, that fraction increases when expected benefits are likely to be 
higher or costs are likely to be lower; thus consumers seem to behave at least directionally in 
accordance with search theory, consistent with the broader lack of a significant informed 
minority being due to high search and reading costs of standard form contracts.  
What can, and cannot, be concluded from this study? We can plausibly rule out an 
informed minority mechanism being important in this market. But the absence of this mechanism 
does not automatically prove that EULA terms will be inefficiently biased in favor of sellers, as 
sellers could be disciplined by other mechanisms, the most notable being a concern for their 
reputation. In other words the informed minority mechanism, while popular in the literature, does 
not appear to provide a relevant check on one-sided standard form contracts, at least not in this 
market, meaning that future empirical work should focus on the potential relevance of these 
alternative mechanisms such as reputational concerns. Furthermore, our findings call into 
question the effectiveness of policies attempting to prevent potential market failures by requiring 
increased or mandatory disclosure. Shoppers do not access EULAs regardless of how accessible 
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they are.5 As a result, disclosure is unlikely by itself to lead to the emergence of an informed 
minority of a meaningful size.  
Section 2 offers academic and legal background on the informed minority hypothesis. 
Section 3 explains our methodology. Section 4 presents our data. Section 5 discusses the results, 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Informed Minority Hypothesis: Academic and Legal Background  
 
In a typical standard form contract scenario, a buyer purchases a good or service and is 
presented with a form contract with terms pertaining to dispute resolution, remedies for product 
failure and warranties, among others. Fine print is pervasive and there is little opportunity to 
negotiate over the terms. Every reader of this article has likely entered into thousands of such 
contracts.  
Despite the benefits associated with standard form use, such as a reduction in drafting 
and negotiation costs, academics and policy makers have debated their fairness and the 
desirability of their enforcement. Concern for consumer welfare has resulted in numerous 
articles, laws, and initiatives to regulate these markets. For example, in addition to existing 
contract law doctrines to protect buyers from abusive terms, such as unconscionability and unfair 
surprise, several state consumer laws prohibit the use of forum selection clauses and disclaimers 
of implied warranties in consumer contracts.6 On the federal front, laws such as the Truth in 
Lending Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act seek to decrease reading and search costs by 
requiring standardized disclosure of mandated terms.7 More recently, there has been heated 
debate whether online contracts such as “Terms of Use,” privacy policies, and software license 
                                                
5 For an analysis of whether increased contract disclosure is associated with increased readership, see Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler & Yannis Bakos, Does Disclosure Matter? (work in progress, 2009). 
6 See, e.g., notes 39, 40, infra. 
7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 1601.  
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agreements should be enforceable or subject to mandatory disclosure rules or contain mandatory 
provisions.8 
 
2.1. The Informed Minority Hypothesis 
The concern that standard form contracts are likely biased towards drafters stems from 
the view that because many buyers do not read or understand the contract terms, sellers will 
impose unfair and one-sided terms. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) show that the existence of 
uninformed consumers need not prevent a competitive outcome. Specifically, they explore the 
conditions under which a market with consumers heterogeneous in their willingness and ability 
to become informed about product prices might reach a perfectly competitive price equilibrium. 
Even when many uninformed consumers exist, a market can yield a competitive equilibrium if 
enough informed consumers do shop for the competitive price: “[T]here is an informational 
externality at work between efficient and inefficient information-gatherers. Those agents who 
become informed give an external economy to the uninformed; the weight of their search keeps 
prices lower. In fact, if there are enough informed agents, the market price will settle down to the 
perfectly competitive price.”9 
Schwartz and Wilde extend this argument to a situation in which consumers vary in their 
ability to become informed about standard form contract terms. They show that if a sufficient 
number of buyers are informed about the price and contract terms of a given product, sellers who 
cannot discriminate between buyer types will offer the product with efficient terms at a 
competitive price to all buyers. This is because when markets are sufficiently competitive, the 
cost to the seller of losing a critical mass of informed consumers outweighs the benefits of 
offering self-serving terms to those uninformed inframarginal consumers.10 The authors conclude 
                                                
8 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (2006) (arguing that browsewraps should be enforced 
only in cases involving sophisticated commercial parties that are repeat players); Hugh Collins, Regulating 
Contracts 279–86 (1999) (arguing that mandatory terms would reduce the contractual one-sidedness caused by 
market imperfections).  
9 Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 3. The authors also mention that “[o]n the other hand, by shopping at high-priced 
stores, the uninformed inflict an external diseconomy on the informed; these informed must gather costly 
information to obtain the lower price.” 
10 Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde, supra note 3. In their model, the equilibrium result depends on the fraction of 
informed consumers. A competitive equilibrium will result if this fraction is “substantial.” If the number is too small 
to support a competitive equilibrium, but it is nonetheless significant, the market will reach an equilibrium with a 
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that imperfect information alone is not sufficient to warrant market intervention, a conclusion 
that would become the cornerstone of the law and economics view of standard form contracts.  
Schwartz and Wilde state that “[g]enerally, there are a significant number of informed 
consumers in any given market prior to legal intervention,”11 although the evidence they cite to 
support this statement would not appear to be so general or conclusive.12 The main issue for 
them is whether these consumers are able to access adequate information at a reasonable cost. 
The cheaper it is to do so, the larger and thus the more influential this informed minority will be. 
The determination of the exact proportion of informed consumers necessary to yield a 
competitive equilibrium is a complicated exercise.13 Nevertheless, many scholars have relied 
repeatedly on the informed minority argument to support freedom of contract in mass market 
transactions.14 
                                                                                                                                                       
cluster of prices. When there is only a small minority of comparison shoppers, the price distribution will converge 
towards a monopoly price (or terms). Schwartz and Wilde at 562.  
11 Schwartz and Wilde (1979), id at 636.  
12 The authors cite a study that examines the effect of the Truth in Lending Act on consumers’ knowledge of the 
interest rates charged by their lenders. They find that prior to the passing of the Act, about 14% of the families in the 
sample estimated accurately the interest rates they paid on their loans and 33% of families did not know their true 
rates of interest on their loans. After the passing of the Act, the percentage of families with accurate estimates 
increased to 21% (a statistically significant difference), and the percentage of families with inaccurate estimates of 
their interest costs decreased to 25%. Lewis Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical 
Test of the Efficacy of the Truth in Lending Law, 26 J. of Finance 1143, 1153 (1971). While the study shows that 
the Truth-in-Lending Act was modestly effective in helping consumers understand the true rate of interest on their 
existing loans, it says nothing as to whether consumers were informed about the menu of prices or contract terms 
available to them when they were shopping among creditors. Furthermore, of all contract terms, price (the interest 
rate) is likely to be the most salient one; the extent to which understanding fine print of these contracts increased in 
presumably even more modest. 
13 Schwartz and Wilde provide a numerical example where the presence of one third of informed consumers would 
generate a competitive equilibrium with respect to price. Changing the relative costs, however, would require a 
different percentage of informed consumers. The authors expect that there will be fewer consumers informed about 
terms in a given market because shopping for terms is costlier than shopping for price, but contend that if 33% of 
those price savvy shoppers are also term savvy, a competitive equilibrium could result. For a critique of this 
illustration, see. R. Ted Cruz and Jeffrey Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to 
Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 Hastings L. J. 636 (1995). See also, Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, 
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2008). But see, Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the 
Market Permit? 37 J. L. Stud. (2008). 
14 For example, Priest relies on the informed minority argument to address the concern that most buyers will not 
factor warranty terms in their purchase decisions. George Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90(6) 
Yale L. J (1981) at 1347. Baird a writes that “[the] typical buyer cannot rely on her own expertise or her ability to 
dicker with her seller. When the market works effectively, however, she benefits from the presence of other, more 
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Courts have also relied on the informed minority argument in deciding whether certain 
standard form contract terms provisions should be enforceable. For example, in ProCD vs. 
Zeidenberg, Judge Easterbrook enforced a restriction in a shrinkwrap license by noting that 
“[t]erms of use are no less a part of ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed 
with which the software compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a 
package's contents, is how consumers are protected in a market economy.”15 
 
2.2. Skeptical Responses 
Other scholars are dubious that markets for standard form terms work so well. Some are 
dismissive based simply on casual observation. Slawson (1975) argues that “[f]or the very reason 
that these terms are imposed rather than agreed upon, they are almost universally unfair.”16 
Rakoff (1983) believes that they should have a presumption of invalidity.17 Failure to read has 
been rationalized based on the low probability that the contingencies specified in the contract 
will materialize as well as individual consumers’ inability to alter the terms anyway.18 Finally, 
some scholars have explained that consumers’ psychological biases and limitations might 
prevent them from reading or understanding terms, once again making them susceptible to seller 
manipulation.19 
                                                                                                                                                       
sophisticated buyers.” Douglas Baird, supra note 4. See also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives 
in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. 
Rev. 563, 614-15 (1982). For examples of references to the informed minority argument outside standard form 
contracts, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution of Products Liability Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2193, 
2204 (1989); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 819, 826 (1992). 
 
15 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
16 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and the Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev 
529, 530 (1975). 
17 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay of Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1226 (1983) (stating 
that “the ideal adherent who would read, understand, and compare several forms is unheard of in the legal literature, 
and, I warrant, in life as well.”) 
18 See, e.g., Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J. of Econ. 518 
(1990); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 240-41 
(1995); Gillette, supra note 4. 
 
19 See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression 
in Competitive Markets, 121 (2) Q. J. of Econ. 505 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1373 (2004); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. 
L.Rev. 1203 (2003); Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 899 (2006).  
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Others challenge the informed minority argument on its own terms. Eisenberg (1995) 
argues that “[t]ypically [a competitive equilibrium] will not occur, because most form takers will 
find it irrational to engage in search and deliberation on any given form.”20 Recently, Ben-Shahar 
(2009) has advocated abandoning recent disclosure proposals that seek to increase the 
“opportunity to read” standard form contracts.21 He asserts that because nobody reads fine print, 
regardless of reduced reading costs in environments such as the Internet, rules that focus on 
increasing contract disclosure are useless, if not dangerous. Lastly, Goldberg (1997) questions 
the existence of the informed minority as well as whether sellers will indeed find it more 
profitable to cater to the readers than to take advantage of the non-readers.22 
Finally, some rely on the informed minority argument to argue against regulation, while 
at the same time expressing reservations. Gillette (2004) argues that standard form contracts 
should be enforceable as long as the interests of those uninformed buyers are indeed accurately 
represented by the informed minority.23 Hillman and Rachlinski (2002) explore the role of the 
informed minority argument in standard form contracting online.24 Following Salop (1976), they 
conclude that although the low cost of becoming informed on the Internet is likely to increase 
number of informed consumers, the free-rider problem introduced by those uninformed 
                                                
20 Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 243-44 (1995). 
 
21 Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law, European Review of Contract Law, 
5(1) (2009). See also Robert Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard 
Terms Backfire?, 104 Mich. L. Rev (2006). 
 
22 Victor P. Goldberg, The “Battle of the Forms”: Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155, 
165 (1997) (“Others will presume that the random buyer they run into will not have read the form and that, by 
stacking the deck, the seller can perhaps gain more from the nonreaders that it loses to the readers.”).See also 
Shmuel Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge is Yet to be Met, 45 Am. Bus. L. J. 
723 (2008). See also Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, J. Law & Econ. 17(2), 
461-92 (1974). 
23 Clayton Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wis. L. Rev. 679, 690 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 
question is whether such a group of informed buyers exists and whether it shares contract terms preferences with 
those non-reading buyers…Indeed, I will suggest that the most difficult issue in finding surrogates for nonreading 
buyers is that one set of buyers may have very different preferences from another set.”). 
24 Robert Hillman and Jeff Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 NYU L. Rev. 429 
(2002).  
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consumers is likely to result in an under-production of knowledgeable buyers.25 Others have 
pointed out that many consumers are unlikely to behave rationally in regards to boilerplate, thus 
making the “informed” minority less effective.Korobkin (2003) notes that even when choosing 
to become informed, boundedly-rational buyers are unlikely to consider all the contract terms of 
product attributes in making a purchase decision.26 He predicts that sellers will offer one-sided 
non-salient terms. 
 
2.3.  Prior Evidence 
Despite the theoretical importance of the informed minority, there has been little serious 
empirical investigation of its validity, presumably because observing “readership” is difficult. 
There is some related survey evidence. In a study of reading practices of online standard form 
contracts, Hillman (2006) surveys 92 contracts students at Cornell Law School and finds that 
only four percent of those who purchased products online claim to read standard form contracts 
“as a general matter.”27 Almost sixty percent of respondents, however, claim that they would be 
prompted to read the contract depending on the type of vendor, the price of the product 
purchased, and the term. Becher and  Unger-Aviram (2009) survey 147 students in law and other 
areas and ask about the likelihood that respondents will read standard terms in different scenarios 
(presented as vignettes in the survey).28 Sixty percent of respondents claim they skim or read 
parts of a standard form contract before entering a transaction. Similarly, in a recent study, 
Bartlett and Plaut (2009) survey 182 undergraduate students to find out the extent to which 
respondents read and understand standard form contracts and, to the extent that respondents 
                                                
25 See Salop, supra note 2. The authors also note that “[r]ational calculation alone cannot explain consumers’ nearly 
universal failure to read standard-forms. In some circumstances, the market should produce a sufficient number of 
consumers who attend to the unlikely contingencies covered by the standard form such that businesses feel 
disciplined.” Id. at 447. 
26 Korobkin, supra note 19. For an account of how consumers’ focus on only those observable attributes of product 
quality distorts sellers’ incentives to produce optimal quality products, see also Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra 
note 2, at 510-11. For other behavioral accounts of why the existence of informed consumers might not result in 
competitive outcomes, see Laibson and Gabaix, and Bar-Gill, supra note 19. 
27 Robert Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal 
Implications, in Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the Information Economy? (Jane K. Winn, Ed. 2006).  
28 Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and Reality in Consumer Contracting Behavior, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117422. 
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report non-reading, to find out the reasons for that failure to read.29 They find that about 80% of 
respondents claim not to read contracts and much of the remainder claims to “skim” them.  
Although such surveys provide suggestive evidence, they are based on self-reported 
behavior or hypothetical commercial scenarios. The survey subjects are highly unrepresentative 
students, sometimes law students who someday will be writing boilerplate themselves, and who 
are, in a sense, being put on the spot. Our guess is that this leads to a large upward bias in the 
estimate of readership rates, but in any case evidence on actual behavior is required to answer the 
question with any confidence. A recent study by Hillman and Barakat (2009) provides some 
indirect evidence of failure to read; it reports that most of the 100 software publishers with top-
selling software on Amazon.com offer express warranties on their website and disclaim such 
warranties in their EULAs.30 
 Three other studies show that standard form contract terms are less one-sided in favor of 
sellers than might be possible if buyers were completely uninformed, and thus provide indirect 
evidence for the existence of the informed minority. In a study of 62 warranties of an array of 
consumer durable goods, Priest (1981) argues that warranties are not biased towards sellers, but 
rather reflect by the relative ability of buyers and sellers to prevent and insure against loss.31 
Marotta-Wurgler (2007, 2008) analyzes the terms of 647 online EULAs and shows that while 
almost all of them are more restrictive than the relevant default rules, they do not all converge to 
the legal minimum.32 In a study of contracting practices by online retailers, Mann and 
Siebeneicher (2008) find that few sellers offer excessively one-sided terms (and many present 
their contracts in ways that would be deemed unenforceable).33  
 
                                                
29 Robert P. Bartlett, III & Victoria C. Plaut, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of the Non-
Readership of Contracts (mimeo, 2009).  
30 Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Baraka, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 Yale J. L. & Tech. 1 
(2009).  
31 Priest, supra note 14. 
32 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License 
Agreement, 4 J. Emp. L. Stud. 677 (2007); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard 
Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements 5(3) J. Emp. L. Stud. 447 (2008). 
33 Ronald Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Contracting, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 
984 (2008).  
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2.4. Other Perspectives 
While this paper limits its scope to the validity of the informed minority hypothesis, it is 
important to note that law and economics scholars have also proposed other mechanisms that 
would induce markets to behave competitively when consumers are imperfectly informed. For 
instance, when sellers are constrained by reputation or the threat of litigation, they will find it in 
their best interest to offer terms preferred by buyers to protect their reputational investment. Such 
a mechanism could substitute for the informed minority. Sellers might also offer one-sided terms 
to all consumers, only to later relax them to accommodate reasonable buyer complaints.34 
Similarly, in the case of experience goods or repeat purchases, buyers who do not read terms 
might ultimately become familiar with the contents of the sellers’ boilerplate. Our data are not 
conducive to assessing these mechanisms as opposed to the informed minority mechanism. 
 
2.5.  Current Legal Landscape 
 The law governing standard form contracts affords courts great flexibility in deciding 
whether to enforce consumer agreements involving standard terms. Those that conclude that 
sufficient market pressure (either from an informed minority or because sellers are constrained 
by reputation) exists to ensure competitive terms will enforce boilerplate.35 For example, in 
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, mentioned above, Judge Easterbrook enforced a commercial-use 
restriction clause in a shrinkwrapped software license agreement, rejecting the buyer’s argument 
that he couldn’t have agreed to “hidden” terms. He reasoned that the burden is on the buyer to 
protect his own interests: “ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find an 
insert saying ‘you owe us an extra $10,000’ and the seller files suit to collect. Any buyer finding 
such a demand can prevent formation of the contract by returning the package, as can any 
consumer who concludes that the terms of the license make the software worth less than the 
purchase price. Nothing in the UCC requires a seller to maximize the buyer's net gains.”  
 Many courts, like many academics, are less willing to assume that buyers are careful 
shoppers. Many rely on the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate apparently one-sided 
                                                
34 See Gillette, supra note 4; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827 (2006). 
 
35 Enforcement will occur absent fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. 
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contract terms.36 A term will be struck down under this doctrine if it is found to be procedurally 
and substantively unconscionable. The procedural aspect of the inquiry focuses on whether the 
buyer is deprived of an opportunity to meaningfully assent to the terms because the contract is 
hard to find, in miniscule print, hard to understand, or because the buyer lacks meaningful 
choice. The substantive aspect asks whether a particular term is so one-sided that it would “shock 
the conscience” of an informed buyer. Although this doctrine gives courts little guidance on how 
to effectively distinguish mutually beneficial clauses from exploitative ones, courts that believe 
that failure to read might result in seller abuse are somewhat eager to strike down terms.,37 
Similarly, they rely on the “reasonable expectations” doctrine to deny enforcement of clauses 
that are hard to understand or read, enforcing instead rights and obligations a reasonable 
consumer would anticipate.38  
 Furthermore, some state legislatures have mandated particular terms in consumer 
contracts. For example, Idaho,39 North Carolina, and Montana40 have statutes prohibiting the 
enforcement of forum selection clauses in consumer transactions.41 California’s Arbitration Act 
mandates a waiver of arbitration fees for low income consumers and requires arbitration 
                                                
36 Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-302. Comment 1 states that “The principle is one of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise…and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.” 
37 For example, the California Court of Appeals recently struck down as unconscionable an arbitration clause with a 
class action waiver that was visibly included in the fine print of a cell phone service agreement. After noting that 
contracts of adhesion should be carefully examined, the court stated that “[t]he possibility of overreaching is even 
greater in ordinary consumer transactions involving relatively inexpensive goods or services because consumers 
have little incentive to carefully scrutinize the contract terms or to research whether there are adequate alternatives 
with different terms, and companies have every business incentive to craft the terms carefully and to their advantage. 
The unconscionability doctrine ensures that companies are not permitted to exploit this dynamic by imposing overly 
one-sided and onerous terms.” Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 585 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2007).  
38 Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev 961 (1970); See also 
Ben-Shahar, supra note 21. See also Restatement (Second) of Contract § 211. 
39 Idaho Code § 29-110. 
40  N.C.G.S. § 22B-3; Mont. Code 36 § 18-1-403. 
41 Several courts also refuse to enforce forum selection clauses. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Gainesville Iron 
Works, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 829 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972). For a more detailed review of prohibitions on dispute resolution 
clauses, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing? in 
(Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts (Omri Ben-Shahar, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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organizations to make all consumer arbitration decisions publicly available.42 There are also 
several federal laws that, conceptually, aim to increase the size of the informed minority by 
decreasing reading and comparison shopping costs. The most famous is the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, a disclosure law enacted in 1975 to regulate the form and content of consumer 
product warranties.43 It requires that sellers who provide warranties draft them in clear language 
and present them in a standardized fashion.44 It also seeks to reduce shopping costs by requiring 
that warranties be available for inspection prior to purchase.45 Yet despite these protective 
measures, the law is that buyers are under a duty to read standard form contracts and are thus 
deemed to have given “blanket assent” to reasonable terms whether they have read them or not.46  
 There are additional, recent proposals to protect consumers in mass market transactions, 
especially those that take place over the Internet, the context of this study, by seeking to facilitate 
contract access. Some of the most contentious proposals involve software and other information 
goods. For example, the American Law Institute (ALI) has approved new Principles of Software 
Contracts to harmonize and increase certainty of the laws governing software transactions online. 
One of its main goals is to “promote reading and the opportunity to read terms” as a way of 
alleviating market failures.47 For example, the rules require software vendors to post the terms of 
their license agreements in their corporate website, thus effectively eliminating pure “pay now, 
terms later” contracts in Internet transactions (where buyers cannot access the contract until after 
                                                
42 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1284.3, 1281.96.  
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(a). Another prominent example is the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), a disclosure law that 
seeks to protect consumers in credit transactions by requiring a clear and standardized disclosure of the essential 
terms and costs associated with the deal. 15 U.S.C. § 1601. 
46 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, 370-1 (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company,) (1960). 
47 ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts [hereinafter ALI Principles] at 117. The reporter explains that 
“because case reports and the websites of watchdog groups already evidence vendors’ use of unsavory terms, [the] 
Principles assume that market pressure is insufficient in software retail markets to assure the production of 
reasonable terms, both in presentation and substantive content… The preferred strategy of [the] Principles is to draft 
rules that promote reading terms before committing to a transfer, which, in turn, should decrease the instances of 
market failure.” ALI Principles at 115. For a detailed account of these proposals and an analysis rejecting the 
“opportunity to read” approach, see Omri Ben-Shahar, supra note 21. 
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they had paid for the product).48 In addition, the ALI rules would deem many browsewraps—
contracts referenced by hyperlinks that don’t have to be expressly agreed to, such as websites’ 
“Terms of Use”—unenforceable.49 
  Another well-known effort to create a uniform and cohesive body of law for computer 
information including software is the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA). This is a model act drafted by the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The act has been met with strong 
opposition academics and consumer advocates, and it has so far been enacted only in Maryland 
and Virginia.50 One of the reasons UCITA has encountered resistance is that, in contrast to the 
ALI’s Principles, it allows enforcement of “pay now, terms later” contracts as long as buyers are 
made to assent to the terms (such as a EULA) and are able to return the software after having had 
an opportunity to review them. But ultimately, whether the approach endorsed by the drafters of 
the Principles or the drafters of UCITA is the most appropriate depends on whether there is 
market failure and whether increased disclosure would ameliorate it at acceptable costs; this 
study sheds empirical light on these questions.  
 
3.  Research Framework 
 
 Given the various theoretical arguments and significant practical consequences for courts 
and consumers, it seems critical to investigate whether an informed minority of buyers capable 
of disciplining the market actually exists. Our approach is to study the browsing and shopping 
behavior of online consumers. We track the behavior of Internet visitors to 66 software 
                                                
48 For a study of whether sellers who use “pay now, terms later” contracts offer more one-sided terms than sellers 
who disclose their contract prior to purchase, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” 
Contracts Worse For Buyers? Evidence From Software License Agreements, 38(2) J. Leg. Stud. (2009).   
49 ALI Principles §2.02(b). The comments to this section state that “[f]or example, mere reference to standard terms 
found on another page (browsewrap) may be insufficient under the reasonable-transferor test unless the transferee is 
already well-acquainted with the terms, for example, from previous notices and transactions”, at 124. In some 
circumstances, even terms that appear in a hyperlink next to a box where the consumer must click on “I agree” could 
also be unenforceable if the consumer was unaware of the terms because of a lack of previous dealings with the 
seller. ALI Principles at 125. 
 
50 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (Michie. 2001); Md. Code Ann. Comm. Law §§ 22-101 to 22-816 
(Supp. 2002).  
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companies. We examine the rate at which shoppers choose to become informed about the 
EULAs that govern the featured software.  
Online software purchases provide an apt setting to look for the informed minority. First, 
while non-price features such as the associated contractual rights and restrictions are important 
for all types of products, it is a particularly significant consideration for information goods such 
as software because terms form an integral part of the way the product is or may be used. 
Second, some of the terms in EULAs have been heavily litigated in the past decade.51 For 
instance, as end-users increasingly rely on software to perform a variety of routine tasks and 
critical functions, damages from software failure can be significant. Third, shopping for 
competing goods and the terms that govern them is cheap and easy online relative to most 
commercial settings. To the extent the informed minority exists, this is among the settings where 
we are relatively likely to find it, especially given our access to clickstream data. Finally, as 
mentioned above, several recent debates on legal reform in standard form contracts focus on 
electronic contracts in general and software contracts in particular. A study of the informed 
minority in online software markets places us at the center of these debates.  
In order to empirically investigate the existence and size of the informed minority, we 
classify visitors to the websites of the companies in our sample, described below, into potential 
buyers and those visiting for other reasons. Inspection of a sample of URLs clicked shows these 
reasons to include the following: to look for online instruction manuals, perhaps for a product 
they already own; to search user forums for troubleshooting information; to watch entertaining 
advertising such as the “Mac vs. PC” commercials; and so on. We denote by  the fraction of 
potential buyers (“shoppers”); non-shoppers make up the remaining fraction . We denote by 
 the fraction of shoppers and by  the fraction of non-shoppers that read the online EULAs. 
Finally, we denote by  the fraction that purchase the product (“buyers”) among shoppers that 
read the EULA and by  the fraction of buyers among shoppers that do not read the EULA. 
                                                
51 See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000);  Davidson & Assoc. v. 
Internet Gateway, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (D. Mo. 2004); Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc. 424 F.3d 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2005).  
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This framework is depicted in Figure 1. In this setting, the informed minority corresponds to the 
fraction  of shoppers that reads the online EULA.52 
In what follows we estimate the number of visitors in our sample for each of the six 
categories shown in Figure 1. That is, we estimate the number of readers and nonreaders among 
visitors classified as buyers, shoppers and non-shoppers. We use access to a EULA page for 
more than 1 second to identify readers; this method is likely to bias upward our estimate of the 
informed minority in that some EULA accesses are accidental, are inconsequential to the buying 
decision, are accessed so briefly that little content could have been grasped, or are read but the 
legal jargon is not understood. We use initiation of a secure checkout process to identify buyers. 
We use other contextual information to distinguish shoppers from non-shoppers.  
We can break down readers into  readers that buy and  readers that do not 
buy. In addition,  buyers are not readers, and  shoppers neither read nor 
buy. A priori, we expect that few non-shoppers read EULAs and thus we expect  to be 
small. Finally, the fraction of non-shoppers that do not read EULAs is , which, as 
expected and as we confirm, is large. With these inputs, we can estimate the fraction  of 
shoppers in the informed minority as . We then 
analyze the seller’s choice of which terms to offer to assess whether our estimates are plausibly 
consistent with an informed minority equilibrium. 
 
4. Data 
 
Our clickstream data set represents the browsing behavior of 92,411 U.S. households for 
January 2007. These data were made available to us by a major online research company which 
                                                
52 It is possible that for some shoppers accessing the EULA will not affect their probability of buying the product. 
For instance, some shoppers may not know what a EULA is, or discover after accessing the EULA that they are not 
capable to comprehend its language, or may access it accidentally or out of curiosity. To the extent that such 
accesses of the EULA do not make a shopper part of the “informed minority,”  will overestimate the informed 
minority fraction of shoppers. We can explore the significance of this to some degree by studying time spent on the 
EULA page by those that access it. On the other hand, because we don’t consider other ways in which shoppers 
might become informed about the terms (e.g., word of mouth, or repeat purchases), there is a possibility that  will 
underestimate the size of the informed minority. We comment on the likely significance of this effect in Section 5. 
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has recruited a representative panel of U.S. households that have agreed to install on their 
computers a data collection plug-in that records the URL address of each webpage visited. The 
data collected include the exact sequence of web pages visited and the amount of time spent on 
each page. In raw form, this is a very large dataset.53  
The panel of households was selected to be demographically and geographically balanced 
and representative of the population of U.S. households with Internet access.54 The information 
captured for each web page visited by a panelist in the raw data is coded with a user identifier 
that anonymously but uniquely identifies each panelist and a session identifier that delimits each 
panelist’s web browsing into separate “sessions.” Additional information captured includes the 
URL of each page visited, the time that webpage was accessed, the time spent on that page, 
whether that page was within a secure (i.e., encrypted) connection, the web server delivering the 
web page, and a unique identifier for the company or division owning that web server. The 
recorded page views comprise the bulk of the data, but we were provided with useful additional 
files included non-personally identifiable demographic information about the panelists, and a 
corporate hierarchy identifying the parents, if any, for the divisions or companies owning the 
web servers that appear in the data (e.g., office.microsoft.com and mail.hotmail.com are properly 
identified as companies or divisions having the same corporate parent, Microsoft). 
 
4.1. Sample Construction 
Within these data we consider one important market and one important contract within 
that market. Specifically, we study user visits to software companies that sell or distribute their 
products through their corporate websites and make their EULAs available on their site for users 
to peruse at their option, prior to any purchase decision. We use the data provider’s classification 
                                                
53 Information was captured for 6,355,922 user sessions in January 2007, with 461,027,284 corresponding web page 
views. 
54 This data provider’s  panel is considered one of the largest representative media research samples in existence. 
The sample of participants is defined using Random Digit Dialing principles: the company selects a random set of 
phone numbers from all available residential numbers in the U.S. and attempts to recruit each at most 15 times at 
different times of the day and on different days. The panel also includes university students and individuals in the 
workplace. The company updates its demographic information regularly, has implemented various procedures to 
keep the panel updated, and ensures that tracking is unobtrusive to prevent any distortions in behavior. Finally, each 
January, the panel is compared to the U.S. Census Bureau data to maintain its representativeness, so we choose 
January for our analysis (this choice, however, is quite inconsequential to our results).  
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of markets to identify visits only to software companies. We subsequently identify in our data 
two types of software companies that make their products available for online purchase or 
downloading: retailers and freeware providers. Retailers license their software for a price 
through their corporate website. Freeware providers offer their software for free to anyone 
wishing to download it. Examples include browser toolbars, plug-ins, and browsers.55 We are 
interested in observing users’ propensities to become informed about the terms of these two 
types of software.  
For the purpose of a sufficiently homogenous sample of sellers, we exclude subcategories 
such as vendors not making their products available for online purchase or downloading, peer-to-
peer software providers, and web hosting companies. We exclude companies with fewer than 50 
unique visitors that viewed at least two pages during their visit; our interest is in users with intent 
or potential intent to purchase, or “shoppers,” and users that view only a single page are less 
likely to have such intent. We identified 197 companies that satisfied the above conditions. 
For each of these companies we obtained the web page addresses (URLs) of all EULAs 
available on the company’s website. To find these we visited each company’s website and used 
manual browsing, Google searches within the website and, if available, searches of the website 
provided by the company. In addition, we searched all page views in the clickstream data 
corresponding to these companies to identify possible EULA pages (e.g., pages whose web 
address contained “EULA” or “legal” or “terms”), which we then investigated manually. Finally, 
we remove companies that did not make their EULAs available online as well as companies that 
required users to agree to their EULAs during their checkout process (by making them click “I 
agree” below a text box with the EULA or next to a hyperlink with the EULA). After excluding 
all these companies that do not provide enough data or otherwise are inappropriate for our tests, 
we arrive at a final sample of 56 retail and 10 freeware companies. We mention here that we see 
no reason to believe that our basic results or conclusions would change significantly were we to 
enlarge the number of companies in the sample or the time window that panelists were followed. 
Also, the size of our sample is probably more usefully characterized in terms of the tens of 
                                                
55 We classify a company as retail if it offers its core or much of its software for sale, even if it also offers software 
for free. For example, Adobe offers several free plug-ins, such as Shockwave and a PDF reader, but we classify it as 
retail. 
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thousands of company visits that we track, described shortly, because each of these represents an 
opportunity to access a EULA and is thus the essential unit of observation. 
 
4.2. Company and Product Characteristics 
All else equal, consumers may feel less need to scrutinize the terms in EULAs from 
companies that are large or old because they assume that such companies are more trustworthy 
and fair. To test this hypothesis, we obtain information about each company’s annual revenue, 
year of incorporation, and public or private status. These data are from Hoovers.com, Yahoo! 
Finance, or direct communications with the companies in the sample.  
Panel A in Table 1 reports summary statistics for the company characteristics for the two 
types of companies analyzed. For retail companies, average revenue is $2.14 billion with a 
standard deviation of $8.19 billion, a number obviously driven by a few large firms. Median 
revenue for this category is $13.8 million. The mean age of these companies, measured as 2009 
minus the year of incorporation, is 17.3 years old (median is 15). Thirty percent of the companies 
in this category are publicly traded. In contrast, the mean age of freeware firms is 10.2 (median is 
7), and only ten percent of these companies are publicly traded.  
We collect several product characteristics. For each company, we record one “flagship” 
product per company. Many small and medium size companies market one main product, in 
which case we select that product. For larger companies, we select the product accounting for the 
largest fraction of sales or, when this information was not available, we selected the product 
most prominently featured on the website. A reasonable hypothesis is that users are more 
inclined to become informed about the EULA terms of higher priced products, so we record the 
price for the flagship product as well as median price of all products available on the website for 
that firm. We record whether the product is a single or multi-use license, because multi-seat 
licenses are likely to have higher prices, and whether the product is offered to developers. We 
note whether the company offers a trial version of the flagship product and also of the majority 
of its products because that may also affect users’ propensity to read terms.56 We also note 
                                                
56 Trial versions are generally offered with limited functionalities over a limited time period. Marotta-Wurgler 
(2007) found that the majority of trial licenses are noticeably different from the product licenses (e.g., the trial 
license reads “Trial License” and is generally shorter than the product license), such that a user would not consider 
them substitutes. 
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whether the product is oriented toward business users or the general public. Finally, we classify 
each product into one of 150 software product categories, e.g. antivirus or word processing, 
based on the characterizations of software products available at Amazon.com.  
Panel B reports summary statistics for the flagship products’ characteristics. The average 
product price for retail companies is $484 and the median is $64. For each company we compute 
the median price of all software products listed on the website, and the mean of those medians is 
$389; the median of the median is $47. A fraction of 68% of retail products and 90% of freeware 
appears targeted to the general public (or very small businesses) as opposed to large businesses. 
Finally, 86% of retail sales sites offer a trial version of their featured product or of the product in 
our sample, and 80% offer trial versions for most of their products.  
 
4.3. Contract Characteristics 
We want to measure the fraction of shoppers that become informed about EULA terms. 
We thus collect all the EULA URLs that are available on a company’s website. As noted above, 
many firms only sell one product and thus they only make available online the EULA that 
governs the use of that product. Other firms sell many products that are all governed by a single 
EULA posted on their website, and others post different EULAs for different products. Finally, 
some firms post the EULAs for all their current and past versions of all their products. We found 
240 unique URLs corresponding to EULAs for our 56 retail companies and 34 unique URLs 
corresponding to EULAs for for our 10 freeware companies.  
 
4.4. Defining Shoppers and Shopping Visits 
Panelists in our data unfortunately don’t come labeled as “shoppers” when they visit a 
given company’s website. We must therefore define shoppers, i.e. visitors with some potential to 
purchase. Our data provider reports all the Internet browsing activity of its users and a large 
fraction of visitors may be browsing without any intent to purchase; potential motivations behind 
such browsing were mentioned above. This is more of an issue with larger diversified websites 
that provide significant non-product oriented content such as Microsoft, Adobe, or Symantec. 
Smaller companies generally have sparser websites focused on supporting the purchase process. 
As noted earlier, our data provider tracks the particular web servers that host the URLs accessed, 
which allows us to exclude visits clearly unrelated to shopping. 
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To restrict our analysis to visitors with potential intent to purchase, we exclude visits that 
do not access servers dedicated to shopping or purchasing activities. For example, Microsoft, 
Adobe, and Symantec locate their user forums, software patches and rebate pages on separate 
servers, such as adobeforums.com and symantecrebates.com. We then adopt a variety of 
additional approaches to identify shopping-oriented visits more precisely.  
We define a “user visit” as all page views (URL accesses) from a company’s website 
within a single user “session.” One way of identifying shoppers is by examining the intensity of 
a company visit. A user with intent to purchase is likely to view several pages in the retail side of 
the company’s website. Our broadest definition of a shopping visit is a visit with at least two 
page views, as a minimal definition.57 A second, more restrictive definition includes all visits by 
users who accessed at least five pages in a given company’s website.  This is progressively more 
likely to exclude casual browsers.58 
At the other extreme, a visitor that has selected a product and initiated a checkout or 
payment process has demonstrated intent to purchase. Thus, we use the initiation of the checkout 
process as the strictest criterion to identify visits with intent to purchase. We identify such events 
by identifying and subsequently recognizing for the 66 companies in our sample the web page 
addresses that would be utilized only during the checkout and payment process.59 While knowing 
that a user started a checkout or payment process provides no guarantee that the transaction was 
completed, it indicates an extremely high likelihood that a transaction was at least contemplated. 
                                                
57 The literature that studies Internet shopping and browsing behavior generally excludes visits to companies with 
only one page view, as they have been found to be mostly mistakes or the result of redirects. Instead, the two-URL 
definition has been used extensively in the literature to define a valid company visit. See Randolph E. Bucklin & 
Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior Estimated on Clickstream Data, J. of Marketing Res. 
Vol. XL, 249-267 (2003); Wendy W. Moe & Peter S. Fader, Dynamic Conversion Behavior at e-Commerce Sites, 
Mgmt. Sci. 50 (2004); Catledge, Lara D. and James E. Pitkow, Characterizing Browsing Behaviors on the World 
Wide Web, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, 27 (6) (1995), 1065–73. 
58 Several studies have shown that visits with higher page views are more likely to result in purchases. Bucklin & 
Sismeiro, supra note 57; Wendy Moe, Hugh Chipman, Ed George, & George McCulloch, A Bayesian Tree Model of 
Online Purchasing Behavior Using In-Store Navigational Clickstream Data (working paper 2002). Moe et al identify 
different browsing behaviors by shoppers to a particular website and find that shoppers view an average of 4.01 
pages in a given session. 
59 Some companies have integrated handling of part or all of the checkout and payment process within their own 
website, while other companies outsource parts of the checkout and/or payment processes. For instance, when a 
visitor proceeds to checkout, they may be redirected to a company like Digital River that will process the 
transaction. This mode of checkout is common. Sometimes, in addition to the checkout company, a payment 
company is involved in completing the transaction such as PayPal. We account for these situations. 
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This definition of shopping visit, relative to the other two, is overly restrictive, as it excludes 
those that do not result in the initiation of a checkout process.60 
A possible concern with the  last definition above is that it would exclude shoppers who 
access the EULA and decide not to purchase, which would bias the estimated size of the 
informed minority if the conversion rates for readers and non-readers differ. If we are willing to 
assume that shoppers with true intent to purchase may visit several merchants, but in the end will 
purchase from some merchant (which may or may not be included in our sample), and that 
among these shoppers the ones that constitute the informed minority (i.e., those that access 
EULAs) are equally likely to do so in any of the merchants they visit, then the behavior of the 
visitors that initiate a checkout session will be representative of the shoppers as a whole. Their 
likelihood to access EULAs then provides an appropriate estimate for the size of the informed 
minority. These assumptions seem reasonable, given that our sample consists of most or all 
major software vendors and several smaller ones, and that browsing behavior is followed for a 
reasonably extensive period of time. We also address these points in Section 5.2. 
To summarize, the three measures described above establish the shopping intent of a 
session with increasing strictness. As our definitions of a shopping visit become stricter, we 
expect that estimates of the informed minority become more conservative, and the actual number 
is likely to lie somewhere between the three estimates that our methodology provides. 
 
4.5. Defining Shopping Visits: Single Sessions Versus Monthly Aggregates 
A last issue with defining a shopping visit is ascertaining the length of time of a particular 
visit. Our data provider and the industry in general define user sessions as periods of web 
browsing activity separated by at least 30 minutes of inactivity. Under this definition, a user can 
have multiple visits to a given company in a day, a week, or a month. We adopt this definition to 
be consistent with prior literature.61 We refer to all page views from a unique company’s website 
within a single user session as a “company visit” by that user. For example, consider an 
uninterrupted session where a particular user first visits Symantec (a company in our sample), 
then Banana Republic, and then McAfee (another company in our sample). This session yields 
                                                
60 Given the low conversion rates in electronic commerce, such visits are likely to represent the majority of shopping 
visits. 
61 See Moe & Fader, supra note 57. 
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two unique “company visits” in our sample: one to Symantec and one to McAfee. If, after 
visiting McAfee, the user goes back to Symantec within the same uninterrupted session, we 
aggregate that second visit to Symantec with the first visit to that company. If this user is 
deciding whether to buy from McAfee or Symantec, this aggregation method still allows us to 
see whether the user accessed EULAs when deciding which product to purchase.  
Despite its popularity in this literature, the uninterrupted session measure might be too 
narrow. It is conceivable that a user’s shopping activity on a given company spans several days 
or even weeks. Research on Internet shopping behavior reveals that because visiting and 
“traveling” to a store on the web is free and simple, users are more inclined to visit the company 
several times over an extended period before finally deciding whether or what to purchase.62 
Thus, users accrue information about a product over time and across several visits. If this is the 
case, then the uninterrupted session measure will overestimate the number of visits with intent to 
purchase. To account for this, we adopt the methodology of Johnson et al (2004).63 They 
conclude that repeated visits to a company within a month typically correspond to the same 
shopping cycle. We thus aggregate visits to a unique company in a given month and present 
these aggregated sessions as an alternative measure of a company visit with intent to purchase.64 
 
4.6.  Demographic and Geographic Data 
To identify characteristics of shoppers and shopping households that affect their 
likelihood of becoming informed about standard terms, we also utilize personal information 
about them. We have the age and sex of the head of the household, household income, household 
size, and whether there are children present in the household. Table 2 reports summary statistics.  
                                                
62 Id. 
63 Eric J. Johnson, Wendy W. Moe, Peter S. Fader, Steven Bellman, & Gerald L. Lohse, On the Depth and 
Dynamics of Online Search Behavior, 50 Mgmt. Sci. 3, 299-308 (2004) (finding that less than 1% of all month-long 
sessions in their sample contained more than one purchasing transaction in a given company).  
64 A possibility here is that, for some users, we might compound multiple shopping visits into a single one, thus 
undercounting the number of shopping visits (and, conversely, overcounting the fraction with EULA visits). On the 
other hand, this measure may allow us to include repeated short visits to a given company that would be excluded 
under the alternative measures of visit. As noted earlier, we expect that actual shopping visits will lie somewhere in 
the middle. In any case, the results for the various definitions of visits are similar. 
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Panel A includes visitors who accessed a minimum of two pages in at least one of the 
companies in the sample during a single uninterrupted session. The sample is comprised of 
45,091 unique visitors. The average age of the users in this group is 46, and the range is 
reportedly from 18 to 99. Average income for heads of households is $60,487 with a standard 
deviation of $39,666. Income (and perhaps age) is topcoded; median income ($37,500) better 
describes the sample. About half of the heads of households are male. The average number of 
household members is 2.8. There are children in 41% of these households.  
Panel B reports summary statistics for the sample of visitors who accessed a minimum of 
five page visits in at least one company. Given that this is a more restrictive measure of a visit 
with intent to purchase, the sample drops to 31,969 unique household user-visitors. The 
characteristics of these users are similar to those above. Panel C reports summary statistics for 
user-visitors that have selected a product for purchase and have begun the checkout process. 
Here there are 1,653 unique user-visits. Since online conversion rates are generally less than two 
percent across all goods, the size of this sample relative to all shopping visits is a little larger. 
The users in this subsample are also similar to those in the others.  
 
5. Results 
  
Our analysis here is based on company/shopping visits in which the user accessed a 
EULA. We identify these visits by matching the URLs corresponding to all the EULAs we 
collected to the clickstream of URLs accessed by users during their company visits. We compute 
descriptive statistics of company visits and EULA accesses under alternative definitions of a visit 
with intent to purchase. Finally, we present regressions to study the determinants of the (as it 
turns out, low) probability that a EULA will be accessed. 
 
5.1. Company Visits and EULA Accesses 
Recall that we wish to measure the fraction of buyers that seeks to become informed 
about EULA terms in deciding whether to purchase, and as noted we have defined the sample to 
include only those company websites where EULA access is possible but optional. Tables 3 and 
4 summarize the characteristics of visits to such companies, measured either as uninterrupted 
sessions (Table 3) or visits by unique users, aggregating all the monthly sessions by individual 
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users (Table 4). In each case, the data are presented for each definition of a company/shopping 
visit. We separate visits according to the type of company visited, noting that only retailer visits 
include secure checkout page views; there is no need for a secure checkout process for a free 
product. In addition to the number of company visits under each definition, the left halves of 
these tables show the number of pages viewed during such visits, and the duration of the visits in 
seconds. In the right halves, we tabulate the subset of these visits that included a EULA access, 
the number of pages viewed before the first EULA access, and the length of time spent viewing 
EULAs in visits where a one was accessed. These last two measures give us some indication of 
shoppers’ level of care or intent in accessing EULA pages. 
Looking at uninterrupted session/visits (Table 3), under the least strict definition of a visit 
(2 or more pages accessed), there are 120,545 such visits to software retailers and 28,007 to 
freeware providers, including repeat visitors. For retail companies, an average visit consisted of 
12.4 page views over 311 seconds (5.2 minutes). These numbers, however, are driven by 
extreme values. The median number of pages visited in any given company is 5 and the median 
time spent is 105 seconds (1.75 minutes).  
The data indicate that EULAs were accessed in only 55 of the 120,545 visits to software 
retailers (0.05% of all such visits) and in 40 visits to freeware companies (0.14%). Users that 
accessed EULAs visited an average of 12.2 pages (median of 7 pages) in that company’s site 
prior to the EULA page. These figures are already telling, but another consideration is whether 
shoppers who access the EULA actually read it. For users in this group, the average time on the 
EULA page was 47.7 seconds and the median time was 29 seconds. (Note that we are defining 
“access” as a EULA visit of at least one second, for purposes of obtaining a conservatively high 
number of EULA accesses.) The average number of words of EULAs for retail products in the 
sample (unreported) is 2,277 with a standard deviation of 1,148 words. The time spent on the 
EULAs relative to their length indicates that most readers did not read terms in their entirety. 
The average reading rate of American adults is 250 to 300 words per minute, so a complete read 
of the typical EULA would require 8 or 10 minutes, not less than one minute.65 In other words, 
even the small number of EULAs accessed in our sample is still likely to be an overestimate, 
probably a substantial overestimate, of the number of effectively informed readers. 
                                                
65 See Bailey, R.W & Bailey, L.M, Reading speeds using RSVP, User Interface Update (1999). 
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Visits to freeware providers have fewer page views (the median is 4 pages) and are of 
shorter duration (median time spent is 43 seconds). This is expected, as freeware sites tend to be 
sparser. EULAs are accessed in 0.14% of these visits. The median time spent on EULAs is also 
29 seconds, against a median length of these EULAs of 1,754 words, so an overcount of 
effective readers is likely here also.  
When a visit is defined to require five or more pages accessed at the company visited, 
there are 67,769 uninterrupted session/visits to software retailers and 13,520 to freeware 
companies. The median number of pages viewed in a given visit to a retailer is now 10 pages and 
the median length is 185 seconds (3.1 minutes). Distributions of page views and duration are 
again skewed. EULAs were accessed at a slightly higher rate in these visits, 50 times among 
software retailers (0.07%) and 30 visits among freeware companies (0.22%). The median 
number of pages seen before accessing a EULA was 8 for retailers and 4 for freeware providers.  
Finally, limiting our consideration to visits to software retailers that included initiation of 
a secure checkout session, the number of visits falls to 5,509, with similar median page views per 
visit, but about twice as long mean and median durations. This is expected since purchases 
require more time to process the transaction. In this restricted sample, there are 5 voluntary 
accesses of a EULA in the course of purchase, constituting 0.11% of all visits. The median 
number of pages accessed is 20 for users in this group, suggesting even more intense shopping 
within the site. The median time spent in the EULA also doubles for users in this group. 
Interestingly, out of all sessions with EULA visits, 4% (if we use the two page visit definition) or 
8% (if we use the five page visit definition) resulted in purchases. These numbers are 
significantly higher than the typical 2% conversion rate in Internet purchases.  
Aggregating all monthly sessions of an individual user into a monthly visit (shown in 
Table 4) leads to similar results. In most cases the total number of visits is reduced as multiple 
visits by individual users are combined. The average number of sessions per user is 3.2 
(unreported). Not surprisingly, the results for the most inclusive definition of a visit, at least two 
page views, do indicate that this category captures a nontrivial number of casual browsers with 
little intent to shop. An exception is software retailer visits that included initiation of a secure 
checkout session. Visits with secure checkout increase, albeit moderately, because combining 
visits for certain users on a monthly basis resulted in a qualifying monthly visit replacing two or 
more non-qualifying uninterrupted session visits. The overall results of Table 4, however, 
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indicate that the impressions from Table 3 are robust to the precise definition of company visits. 
Ultimately, the highest fraction of readers among retail shoppers across all shopper and session 
definitions is 0.17%, meaning that there are about two readers per every one thousand shoppers.  
 
5.2. Interpreting the Results: Can this be an Informed Minority Equilibrium? 
Coming back to the empirical framework of Figure 1, visitors to the websites of the 
companies in our sample can be classified into potential buyers or users visiting for other 
reasons, such as looking for online instruction manuals for a product they already own, to search 
user forums for troubleshooting information, or for entertainment—e.g., to watch the “Mac vs. 
PC” commercials. We measure the total number of page views during each visit, as well as 
whether a EULA was accessed and whether a secure checkout session was initiated. This data, 
reported for individual sessions in Table 3 and for monthly visitors in Table 4, allows us to 
estimate the number of readers, buyers and shoppers by using access to a EULA page as a proxy 
for reading, initiating the checkout process as a proxy for buying, visits with 5 or more page 
views as a proxy for identifying shoppers and visits between 2 and 5 page views as a proxy for 
identifying non-shoppers. Based on the data in Table 4, we estimate the number of monthly 
visitors in our sample for each of the six categories shown in Figure 1. 
The  readers that buy and  readers that do not buy are 6 and 43, respectively. 
There are  or 3,528 buyers that are not readers, and  or 37,120 shoppers 
that neither read nor buy. Few non-shoppers would be expected to read EULAs, so it is not 
surprising that  is small; in our sample it equals 4 (out of 22,575 visits). Finally, the large 
majority of non-shoppers do not read EULAs; this number is  or 22,571 based on 
the above proxies. We thus arrive at an estimate for the fraction  of shoppers that are in the 
informed minority of . 
It is possible that considering all visitors with 5 or more page views as shoppers will 
overestimate the number of shoppers. An alternative estimate could be obtained by assuming that 
among actual shoppers, the “conversion ratio” to initiate a checkout session among non-readers 
is the same as that for readers at 6/49 = 12.2% (which is higher than purchase conversion ratios 
of 2-5% cited in the marketing literature, but reasonable if not all checkout sessions that we 
 29 
capture result in actual purchases). In that case the informed minority fraction for all shoppers 
would be the same as the fraction for buyers, i.e. 6/3534 = 0.17%.66,67  
The bottom line is that the fraction of visitors that access EULAs is very small, on the 
order of 0.1%. While a number of alternative estimates can be calculated, these estimates point to 
that fraction being well under 1%. Is it conceivable that such a small informed minority could 
protect all buyers and discipline sellers into providing efficient contract terms, thus preventing a 
market failure? The literature offers few meaningful suggestions as to how large the informed 
minority needs to be, and these are typically provided in the context of illustrative examples. 
Schwartz and Wilde offer an example where the informed minority needs to be 20% to 30% to 
be effective. Our estimates here are imperfect, but they are two orders of magnitude smaller.68  
Theoretically, the size of informed minority required to induce sellers to provide good 
terms depends on the tradeoff between the gross profit from selling to informed buyers 
(determined from the marginal cost of the product) and the cost of providing better contract 
terms. Specifically, consider a seller that may offer standard contract terms  that are more or less 
favorable to the buyers, which we will call respectively “good” and “bad” terms. The fraction  
of buyers that become informed about the terms reflects the cost of finding and reading the 
standard form contract and the expected benefit from doing so, and is determined based on the 
                                                
66 Most models of the informed minority predict that the conversion ratio for non-readers would be the same or 
higher as the conversion ratio for readers, as the latter will be less likely to purchase the product if they are not 
satisfied with the terms of the EULA. An upper bound on the size of the informed minority can be obtained if we 
assume that , i.e., that 100% of non-readers proceed to purchase the product. In that case the informed 
minority would be 49/(3534+43) = 1.37% of the total number of shoppers.  
67 As mentioned in section 4.4, if we assume that “real” shoppers will purchase from some merchant (while they 
may visit many), and that among these shoppers the ones that constitute the informed minority are equally likely to 
access a EULA in any of the merchants they visit, then the behavior of visitors in our sample that initiate a checkout 
session is representative of shoppers as a whole, and their likelihood to access EULAs (0.17%) provides an estimate 
for the size of the informed minority among these most determined shoppers. 
68 The estimates presented above are based on monthly visits as reported in Table 4. This is conservative in the sense 
that using visits defined as individual sessions would result in lower estimates for the size of the small minority. 
Specifically, using session data from Table 3 would result in 5 readers that buy, 45 readers that do not buy, 5,504 
buyers that are not readers, and 62,215 shoppers that neither read nor buy, and 52,776 non-shoppers that include 
only 5 readers. The fraction  of shoppers in the informed minority would be 50/67769 = 0.074%. The fraction of 
readers that initiate checkout sessions would be 5/50 = 10%, and assuming the same conversion ratio for non-readers 
would give 5/5509 = 0.09% as the informed minority. A conversion ratio of 100% for non-readers would give an 
upper bound for the informed minority of 50/(5509+45) = 0.91%. 
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characteristics of the setting (e.g., based on buyer search strategies as in (Schwartz and Wilde 
1979)). In our sample, this corresponds to the fraction  of shoppers that are in the informed 
minority. Buyers value the rights and restrictions incorporated in the standard form contract (e.g., 
warranty terms, the ability to transfer the product, and so on); and thus good terms are valued 
more than bad terms. But good terms are naturally more expensive for the seller to provide than 
bad terms, resulting in corresponding product costs of  and , with . Amending 
our earlier notation, informed buyers purchase with probability  if the terms are good and  if 
the terms are bad ( ), and uninformed buyers still purchase with probability . The exact 
values of ,  and  are determined based on the characteristics of the setting, but it is natural 
to consider . The seller offers good terms if the expected payoff from doing so is 
higher than under bad terms: 
 . 
Equivalently, the fraction of readers required to induce offering good terms is: 
.69 
This fraction becomes smaller as the incremental cost of providing good terms decreases and as 
the probability that shoppers who become informed about the terms will drop out if they see bad 
terms increases.  
This general theoretical conclusion is rather unhelpful by itself, since given certain values 
for these unknown parameters, any fraction of informed shoppers could support an informed 
minority equilibrium. However, the market for software maintenance and support (“M&S”) can 
be used to derive very rough estimates of the likely range of one of these parameters, the 
marginal cost of “good” terms, and put our observed fraction of readers into perspective. M&S is 
                                                
69 An outcome where the seller offers bad terms is inefficient if, assuming buyer valuations  for good terms and 
 for bad terms, , as it corresponds to an inefficient provision of terms because the buyers 
value good terms above the seller’s cost to provide them. 
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a key term in software EULAs,70 and thus the cost of supplying M&S should be an order-of-
magnitude approximation of the cost of offering good EULA terms.71 
To estimate the cost of M&S terms, we obtained product price and annual M&S price for 
520 software products from the 42 software companies in the sample of Marotta-Wurgler (2007) 
that provided M&S separately on a periodic basis (i.e., did not charge per incident). On average, 
M&S were priced at 26% of the product price (exclusive of the M&S). The median is 20% and 
the standard deviation is 22%. Since there was high inter-company correlation, we focused on 
company means. Figure 2 shows the distribution for the 40 companies remaining after dropping 
two outliers with too-high ratios, which has a mean of 0.29, median of 0.24, and standard 
deviation of 0.16.  
Thus a year of M&S for software products72 is on average priced at 25-30% of the 
product price. Since M&S costs are primarily variable (labor) costs, if the market for M&S was 
perfectly competitive, this would provide some indication of the marginal cost of M&S and thus 
a floor on the marginal cost of pro-consumer EULA terms. There are several reasons why 25-
30% of product price may be too high an estimate: consumers may be more likely to purchase 
M&S from the seller of the software, and thus software companies may price as a two-part tariff, 
with a lower price for the upfront purchase (the software product) and a higher price for the 
subsequent purchase (M&S); consumers that purchase M&S are likely to have higher M&S costs 
due to adverse selection and/or moral hazard; software companies may have substantial market 
power in providing M&S due to barriers to entry for competitors that are not as familiar with 
their product or consumers’ propensity to purchase M&S from the seller of the original software. 
All of the above factors would result in a M&S-to-product price ratio that is higher than the cost 
                                                
70 Marotta-Wurgler (2007) identifies and measures 23 important and common terms that allocate rights and risks 
between buyers and sellers of software and M&S is one of these terms. 
71 The analysis of 647 EULAs in Marotta-Wurgler (2007) gives M&S an average value of 0.68 on a scale from 0 to 
+1 where 0 indicates the default terms in the absence of any EULA provisions (no M&S) and +1 indicates free M&S 
for 31 days or more. About three quarters of the sample companies commit to a free (i.e., included in the base price 
of the software) M&S period in their EULAs with these periods ranging from 60 days to 2 years, with a mean of 292 
days and a mode and median of 1 year. Thus M&S provisions in EULAs are significantly more favorable to 
consumers than default, and likely to constitute an important fraction of the cost of offering pro-consumer EULA 
terms. 
72 As mentioned above, one year was the most common as well as the median duration of free M&S for the 
companies that provided such a period of free M&S. 
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of providing M&S. On the other hand, M&S is only one of 23 key EULA terms, which include 
several other types of warranties and permissions to copy or distribute the software that can 
impose opportunity costs. Furthermore, M&S pricing is similar in enterprise software markets, 
where significant competition exists from third-party M&S providers and purchase of M&S 
contracts is almost universal.  
On balance, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of this level of M&S is around 20% of 
the product price, or 0.2p in the notation of section 3.1. Dividing numerator and denominator of 
the fraction of informed buyers necessary to induce the seller to offer good terms by p we get 
. If , which would be the case if readers 
purchase with the same probability as nonreaders when they discover good terms but bad terms 
reduce or eliminate this probability,  and thus , and  and thus 
, we get , or . This is 200 times larger than the value of 
 (or 0.1%) that we observe in the data. Alternatively, our data suggest that in order for 
the informed buyers to induce the seller to offer good terms, the incremental cost of these terms 
would have to be almost negligible at under 0.1% of the selling price.73 In either case, our data 
are unlikely to be consistent with an informed minority equilibrium. 
A similar and perhaps much simpler approach to whether we might be observing an 
informed minority equilibrium here is to look at the seller calculus for visitors that initiate a 
checkout session. In an informed minority equilibrium sellers would be offering good terms and 
according to Table 4, EULAs are accessed 6 out of 3,534 visits with checkout sessions. Since 
initiating a checkout session is a requirement to complete a purchase, if sellers were to offer bad 
terms they might lose up to 100% of these readers. Thus, if sellers are trading off the net revenue 
from the sales to the 6 readers against the cost of providing good terms to the 3,528 nonreaders, 
as would be the case if we were observing an informed minority equilibrium, sellers would keep 
offering good terms if the cost of doing so was less than 0.17% of the selling price. This 
                                                
73 Of course, one could argue that offering a pro-buyer dispute resolution clause might cost the seller 0.1% of price. 
Although it is theoretically possible, we find it unlikely that sellers will change this clause to in response to the 
threat of losing one in one thousand buyers. More important, the terms that matter the most to consumers (such as 
M&S and warranties) are among the costliest ones.  
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argument relies on fewer assumptions than that developed above and once again leads to the 
same conclusion, namely that our data seem inconsistent with an informed minority equilibrium. 
 
5.3. Becoming Informed Without Reading? 
 Some consumers may become informed about EULAs by consulting other websites 
instead of reading the contract.74 The Internet contains several consumer product review sites, 
blog posts with rants about product quality, and specialized news outlets that could perhaps 
discuss the content of standard form contract terms. While casual observation suggests that this 
behavior is unlikely to be widespread, our data allow us to investigate it more directly.  
 From the website www.alexa.com we obtained a list of 25 of the most trafficked sites 
likely to have information about EULA terms, product quality information, and sellers’ practices. 
We then measured the rate at which shoppers accessed these sites. Very few sites focus 
exclusively on software and EULA terms. Other sites that occasionally discuss EULA terms are 
technology-related news sites, such as Wired News and Ars Techica, sites that offer general 
consumer protection news and rants about abusive practices by sellers such as The Consumerist 
and BoingBoing, and general technology news such as PC Magazine. Finally, there are general 
consumer reports that do not focus on software but contain software product reviews, such as 
Consumer Reports. 
We review the particular pages accessed by shoppers in each URL from these 25 sites to 
make sure that the pages accessed contain information about EULAs. We find that  out of the 
148,552 sessions with at least two pages accessed, only three shoppers accessed pages with 
EULA information in consumer review sites.75 At the monthly level, 11,657 (16%) shoppers 
accessed at least one of the 25 consumer sites, but not a single aspect of that activity was related 
to EULAs. Of this group, only 69 shoppers accessed pages with particular software product 
reviews or information such as tax software review pages in that month.76 A total of 84 shoppers 
                                                
74 See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Zarsky, “E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online 
User Participation,” Mich. Telecomm & Tech. L. Rev. 4(2) (2008). 
75 Two shoppers downloaded the EULAlyzer software from Javacool Software to obtain a review of a particular 
EULA. The third accessed a reference to a mock EULA.  
76 A majority of these shoppers accessed reviews on epinions, Consumer Research, and Consumer Reports on 
accounting, tax preparation, and photo editing software.  
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accessed news or general information pages about software, such as how to obtain certain free 
plug-ins. The remaining visits were to pages unrelated to software or EULA terms.  
This investigation confirms anecdotal evidence. It is highly unlikely that shoppers are, to 
an important extent, becoming informed about EULA terms by consulting other online sources, 
suggesting we do not need to qualify our previous conclusions about the existence of an 
informed minority equilibrium.77 
 
5.4. Determinants of EULA Visits 
Although few potential shoppers in our sample actually click on the EULA, it is 
interesting to examine what characteristics of the company, product, user, and website that 
distinguish the readers (or, more precisely, the “clickers”) from the non-readers. We therefore 
estimate logit regressions with the dependent variable being a dummy whether a EULA was 
accessed during a particular company visit.  
The results are in Table 5. The freeware dummy is positive and generally significant, as 
expected given earlier results. Some consumers may fear that there is a “catch” in products 
offered for free. The coefficient for the median product price is positive and significant in several 
samples, as expected in the sense that the terms associated with expensive products involve 
higher costs to the consumer. However, this is not the case for those visits where a checkout 
process is initiated. It is possible that buyers of expensive products are committed to the product 
already, or else lack useful alternatives, and so are less interested in the standard terms. 
 Consumers may be less likely to access EULAs from companies they trust, where trust 
may be proxied for by company size or degree of familiarity. We consider as regressors the 
natural log of a company’s revenues (as a proxy for size) and a public company dummy. The 
coefficient for company revenue is significantly negative, while the public companies dummy is 
                                                
77 There are still a few other ways to become “informed” without reading. One is word of mouth, although it is 
farfetched that this works on significant scale. Another is the mass media. A particularly oppressive term might gain 
notoriety. This actually happened in February of 2009 when a consumer protection site noted that Facebook changed 
its terms of use in a way detrimental to consumers. The story was picked up by major news outlet and ultimately 
Facebook changed its terms. Although this reputational mechanism is interesting in that it can work with very few 
readers, it is not the informed minority mechanism that is the focus of this paper. And of course it is not relevant for 
the hundreds of less-known software sellers whose standard form terms would be of little interest to the popular 
media. 
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actually positive; this provides mixed evidence on the “company familiarity” or reputation 
hypothesis. 
Extensive visits with a large number of page views may have increased likelihood of 
including a EULA access, as, for instance, they may be more likely to represent serious shoppers 
that are likely to access the EULA as part of their due diligence on their prospective purchase, so 
we include the number of (non-EULA) pages accessed as a regressor. This has a generally 
positive effect on the probability of accessing a EULA page.  
Finally, high-income visitors may be better able to understand the language (and 
importance) of EULAs and thus more likely to access them. Alternatively, high-income visitors 
have a higher opportunity cost, and actually be less likely to spend time reading a EULA. We 
include the natural log of income, age, and a dummy for male gender (of the head of household). 
Women are insignificantly more likely to access EULAs than men, and the effects of income and 
age are positive and occasionally significant.  
In unreported regressions we examine whether the option to download the trial version of 
a product affects user’s propensity to access the EULA. As noted in Table 1, a large fraction of 
sellers offer trial versions. A plausible hypothesis is that users that become familiar with the trial 
version of a product might be less inclined to read the EULA of the retail version, perhaps due 
increased familiarity and comfort with the product. There is virtually no relationship between the 
presence of trial versions and users’ likelihood of accessing EULAs for the broadest definitions 
of visits, but when visits are defined as beginning the checkout process, the coefficient on this 
variable is negative and highly significant.  
Finally, we study whether shoppers are less likely to read the EULAs of products that are 
more likely to be purchased repeatedly. Users that become familiar with a product that is 
continuously updated, like Microsoft Office, may feel less need to concern themselves with the 
EULA. Other products, such as test preparation software, are less likely to be purchased 
repeatedly. We create a dummy variable that equals one if the company markets products that are 
in our judgment likely to be repeat purchases. However, we find no relationship between the 
nature of the use of the software and users’ propensity to access EULAs.  
These regressions show some determinants of the probability of EULA access consistent 
with search theory: this probability is higher when the benefits of access are higher, e.g., for 
relatively obscure companies less likely to care about their reputation and that may be felt to be 
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more likely to attempt to force bad terms on an unsuspecting consumer, or when the costs of 
finding EULAs and reading contract terms are likely to be lower, e.g., because consumers have a 
lower opportunity cost for their time or because they are more educated and thus find it easier to 
read contract terms. The impact of these factors, even collectively, is small, however.  The main 
result of this section is that the most important term in the regression is the constant term: 
EULAs are rarely accessed, and thus rarely read, by anyone. 
The small fraction of consumers accessing EULAs suggests a high total cost of finding 
the EULA and reading the terms. If the primary cost is in locating and accessing it, then 
mandating disclosure would reduce this cost, and thus increase the fraction of consumers 
becoming informed. If, on the other hand, the primary cost is in reading and assessing contract 
terms, mandating disclosure is unlikely to have a major impact on the fraction of consumers 
becoming informed.78  
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
 
Consumer access to the terms of standard form contracts that govern consumer 
transactions has been at the center of a legal and policy debate, and a major question has been 
whether disclosure of terms in such contracts should be regulated. A related debate has focused 
on the enforceability of terms and possible need to regulate disclosure for software in general, 
and software purchased online in particular. A central issue in these debates is the validity of the 
informed minority hypothesis, i.e., the view that shoppers informed about standard terms help 
sustain efficient equilibria in the provision of those terms. In this paper we attempt to measure 
directly this informed minority by tracking the extent to which consumers actually do access the 
terms of certain online standard form online contracts. Our clickstream data allow us to measure 
this aspect of consumer behavior with reasonable precision.  
 We find that very few consumers choose to become informed about online standard form 
contracts. In particular, we estimate the fraction of retail software shoppers that accesses EULAs 
at between 0.05% and 0.17%, and the very few shoppers that do access it do not, on average, 
spend enough time on it to have digested more than a fraction of its content. We also document 
                                                
78 In this case, knowing that reading EULA terms is likely to be prohibitively costly, consumers are likely not even 
to access these terms, even if they could do so with only the click of the mouse. 
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that shoppers rarely access other substitute information sources, such as sites with consumer 
product reviews or relevant news, to learn about EULA terms. Even under generous 
assumptions, it is hard to envision the probability that EULAs are read, and understood, growing 
even to 1%. Our estimates of the size of the informed minority in this market are one or two 
orders of magnitude smaller than examples offered in the literature for the size required to 
sustain an informed minority equilibrium. This is confirmed by simple theoretical calculations 
based on estimates of seller costs to provide pro-buyer EULA terms such as maintenance and 
support.  
 While our results were obtained for one standard form contract (EULAs) and in the 
specificcontext of online software purchases, EULA terms are integral to the utility of software 
products and online shopping reduces buyer costs for acquiring product-related information 
(such as EULA terms) and for comparing products offered by different sellers.79 Thus our setting 
is most favorable for demonstrating the informed minority mechanism in action, and our failure 
to find it in this setting raises questions about whether informed minority mechanisms could be 
active in more general contexts in which comparison shopping is harder and costlier. A potential 
implication of our results is that, given the uniform low readership, regulation mandating 
increased accessibility of contract terms may be ineffective. In other work in progress we are 
investigating the extent to with the ease of access to the EULA, based on its specific location on 
the seller’s website, increases readership by potential buyers.80  
                                                
79  See, for example, Bakos, Y. "Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces," 
Management Science, Volume 43, Number 12, December 1997. 
80 Marotta-Wurgler & Bakos, supra note 5. 
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Figure 1. Empirical Framework 
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Figure 2. Annual maintenance to product price ratio, forty companies 
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Table 1. Company and Product Characteristics 
 
 N 
 
Mean 
(s.d) 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Panel A. Company Characteristics 
Retail      
Revenue (Millions $) 56 
2,140 
(8,190) 
0.1 13.8 51,100 
Age (years) 56 
17.30 
(11.03) 
3 15 56 
Public Company 56 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0 0 1 
Freeware      
Revenue (Millions $) 10 
1,390 
(4,390) 
0.1 0.1 13,900 
Age (years) 10 
10.20 
(6.84) 
5 7 27 
Public Company 10 
0.10 
(0.32) 
0 0 1 
Panel B. Product Characteristics 
Retail      
Consumer Product 56 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0 1 1 
Price ($) 56 
483.97 
(1,203.9) 
9.97 63.50 5,295 
Median Price ($) 56 
388.72 
(1,032.53) 
1 47 4,995 
Trial (featured product) 56 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0 1 1 
Trial (most products) 56 
0.80 
(0.40) 
0 1 1 
Freeware      
Consumer Product 10 
0.90 
( 0.47 ) 
0 1 1 
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Table 2. User Characteristics 
Panel A. Users accessing at least 2 pages in at least one sample company 
 N Mean 
(s.d) 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Age (years) 45,091 46.23 
(13.78) 
18 46 99 
Gender (1= Male) 45,091 0.50  
(0.50) 
0 0 1 
Income ($) 45,091 60,487  
(39,666) 
12,500 37,500 150,000+ 
Household Size 45,091 2.78 
(1.27) 
1 3 5+ 
Presence of Children 
(1= Yes) 
45,091 0.41  
(0.49) 
0 0 1 
Panel B. Users accessing at least 5 pages in at least one sample company 
Age (years) 31,969 46.37  
(13.70) 
18 46 99 
Gender (1= Male) 31,969 0.50  
(0.50) 
0 1 1 
Income ($) 31,969 60,566 
(39,719) 
12,500 37,500 150,000+ 
Household Size 31,969 2.79  
(1.27) 
1 3 5+ 
Presence of Children 
(1= Yes) 
31,969 0.41  
(0.49) 
0 0 1 
Panel C. Users initiating checkout in at least one sample company 
Age (years) 1,653 47.29 
(13.90) 
18 47 99 
Gender (1= Male) 1,653 0.51  
(0.50) 
0 1 1 
Income ($) 1,653 64,027  
(42,064) 
12,500 75,000 150,000+ 
Household Size 1,653 2.77  
(1.23) 
1 3 5+ 
Presence of Children 
(1= Yes) 
1,653 0.39  
(0.49) 
0 0 1 
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Table 3. Company and EULA visits. Visits measured as uninterrupted sessions. 
 N of 
company 
visits 
Mean N of 
pg. clicks 
per 
company 
visit  
(s.d.)  
Median N of 
pg. clicks 
per 
company 
visit  
Mean length 
of company 
visit in 
seconds  
(s.d.)  
Median 
length of 
company 
visit in 
seconds 
N of EULA 
visits 
(% of 
company 
visits) 
Mean N of 
pg. viewed 
before 
EULA 
access 
(s.d) 
Median N of 
pg. viewed 
before 
EULA 
access 
Mean length 
of EULA 
access in 
seconds 
(s.d.)  
Median 
length of 
EULA 
access in 
seconds 
Panel A. At Least 2 Pages Accessed During Visit 
Retail 120,545 12.4  
(26.9) 
5 310.9 
(713.6) 
105 55  
(0.05%) 
12.15  
(16.6) 
7 47.7 
(45.4) 
29 
Freeware 28,007 13.6 
(36.9) 
4 163.51 
(618.8) 
43 40  
(0.14%) 
7.45  
(15.4) 
3 99.6 
(237.8) 
29 
Panel B. At Least 5 Pages Accessed During Visit 
Retail 67,769 19.9 
(34) 
10 439 
(903.1) 
185 50  
(0.07%) 
13.2 
(17) 
8 46.9 
(47.3) 
27 
Freeware 13,520 25.2 
(50.6) 
12 239.2 
(856) 
67 30  
(0.22%) 
9.5 
(17.4) 
4 60.6 
(104.5) 
20.5 
Panel C. At Least 1 Secure Checkout Page Accessed During Visit 
Retail 5,509 13.1 
(30.7) 
5 586.5 
(1,939) 
218 5 
(0.11%) 
20.4  
(16.8) 
20 84 
(60.5) 
60 
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Table 4. Company and EULA visits. Visits measures as monthly aggregates of uninterrupted sessions. 
Company N of 
company 
visits 
Mean N of 
pg. clicks 
per 
company 
visit  
(s.d.)  
Median N of 
pg. clicks 
per 
company 
visit  
Mean length 
of company 
visit in 
seconds  
(s.d.)  
Median 
length of 
company 
visit in 
seconds 
N of EULA 
visits 
(% of 
company 
visits) 
Mean N of 
pg. viewed 
before 
EULA 
access 
(s.d) 
Median N of 
pg. viewed 
before 
EULA 
access 
Mean length 
of EULA 
access in 
seconds 
(s.d.)  
Median 
length of 
EULA 
access in 
seconds 
Panel A. At Least 2 Pages Accessed During Visit 
Retail 63,272 23.67 
(79.2) 
7 592.4 
(2,880) 
161 53 
(0.08%) 
21.5  
(43.04) 
9 51.9 
(47.5) 
30 
Freeware 11,010 35.8 
(292.8) 
4    415.9 
(2,811) 
75 42 
(0.38%) 
    10.9 
(22.1) 
3.5 102.5  
(234.9) 
29 
Panel B. At Least 5 Pages Accessed During Visit 
Retail 40,697 35.3 
(96.9) 
14 837 
(2,562) 
292 49  
(0.12%) 
23.1  
(44.4) 
10 50.16 
(47.82) 
29 
Freeware 5,370 70.6 
(416.5) 
11 741.5 
(3,993) 
148 34 
 (0.63%) 
13.2  
(24.1) 
4 104.9  
(251.2) 
25 
Panel C. At Least 1 Secure Checkout Page Accessed During Visit 
Retail 3,534 34 
 (79.1) 
10 1,419 
(4,681.5) 
450 6 
(0.17%) 
24.2  
(23.3) 
16 99  
(60.1) 
94 
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Table 5. Logit regressions of determinants of EULA visits.  
Dependent Variable: EULA access 
 Uninterrupted sessions Monthly aggregate sessions 
 At Least 2 
Pages 
At Least 5 
Pages 
At Least 1 
Secure CP 
At Least 2 
Pages 
At Least 5 
Pages 
At Least 1 
Secure CP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Freeware dummy 1.31* 
(0.71) 
0.99  
(0.84) 
- 2.34***  
(0.62) 
2.17**  
(0.70) 
- 
Ln Med. Price 0.29** 
(0.10) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
-1.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.31***  
(0.09) 
0.30**  
(0.10) 
-1.34*** 
(0.11) 
       
Ln Revenue -0.42***  
(0.03) 
-0.46***  
(0.04) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.42***  
(0.03) 
-0.44***  
(0.04) 
-0.14*  
(0.07) 
Public 1.98*** 
(0.47) 
2.23*** 
(0.55) 
5.84***  
(0.51) 
1.93***  
(0.41) 
2.17*** 
(0.47) 
5.34***  
(0.43) 
       
N Pgs. Viewed 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.02  
(0.01) 
0.04***  
(0.01) 
0.06***  
(0.01) 
0.03**  
(0.01) 
0.04***  
(0.01) 
       
Gender -0.34  
(0.23) 
-0.24  
(0.25) 
-0.06  
(0.19) 
-0.32  
(0.21) 
-0.33 
(0.23) 
-0.10  
(0.19) 
Ln Income 0.15  
(0.16) 
0.21  
(0.18) 
0.29**  
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.22  
(0.16) 
0.20  
(0.13) 
Ln Age 0.55  
(0.37) 
0.33  
(0.40) 
0.70**  
(0.30) 
0.45  
(0.35) 
0.35  
(0.37) 
0.43  
(0.31) 
       
N 148,552 81,289 5,509 74,282 46,067 3,534 
R2 0.10 0.09 0.63 0.12 0.12 0.64 
Note: * = denotes significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 and *** at 0.01. Standard errors are clustered by visitor.  

